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The preponderance of terrorist groups or non state actors is becoming a very serious threat to the security of 
modern African states. The rationalization of these acts has therefore received the attention of scholars within 
and outside the academia. In international ethics for instance, ‘just war theory’ appears to be the most developed 
and widely used criterion for explaining the ‘rightness’ or otherwise of violence. Besides, there seem to be no 
universally accepted definition of terrorism. History shows that any form of violence could be legitimate and 
must not necessarily be the type organised by state actors alone. Therefore, it is the position of this paper that 
violence perpetrated by state and non state actors should be morally and legally justified without any form of 
discrimination. The actions of terrorist groups must be assessed on the same conditions used for state actors. The 
paper concludes that it is only when the above mentioned conditions are fully implemented and genuine 
democracy or democratization takes its full grip on the African continent  that a reduction and a positive 
management of the activities of the  so-called terrorist groups can be realised. 
Keywords: Africa, Democracy, Terrorism, State and War. 
 
Introduction 
St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas appear to be the two most prominent medieval thinkers to have dealt 
systematically with the issue of just war theory. What they had in mind was to study conditions under which it 
would be morally right and justified for a state to go to war or engage in violence. Thus, the possible moral 
grounds for going to war (Jus ad bellum) and the manner in which a just war must be carried out or fought (Jus 
in bello) were the two major concerns of the above mentioned scholars. However, the rising speed, the audience 
population and the popular support given to violence perpetrated by non state actors or terrorist groups in 
modern Africa is a clear indication that the contemporary analysis of the question of just war theory must go 
beyond St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas understanding.  Ordinarily, just war theory ought to be an 
assessment of the morality of war be it from state or non state actors.1 Viewed from this perspective, this paper is 
an attempt to answer the following questions:  Is interstate war the only form of political violence that may ever 
be justified?  If not, how are we to assess the morality of other cases of political violence especially those 
involving non state actors? In short, does just war theory apply to terrorism, and, if so, can terrorism satisfy its 
criteria? 
This paper is made up of two sections. Section one is the theoretical clarification of the concepts of 
terrorism and just war theory. This section analyzes the basic components of just war theory such as: just cause, 
legitimate authority and discrimination and see how it (just war theory) can and should accommodate terrorism. 
Section two is the way forward and lessons for contemporary Africa. These perspectives provide opportunity for 
us to see how under just war theory Africa policy-makers or political leaders should have a rethink of terrorism 
and rather look for a genuine alternative for peace. This is because the main purpose of just war theory is to 
place limits to violence and make peace and not war for war sake. 
 
Conceptual Clarification 
Just war theory, double standard and terrorism 
As noted earlier, the lack of a universally accepted definition of terrorism coupled with the double standard 
applied to the just war theory by some scholars has led to many unresolved issues in moral and political 
philosophy. As Andrew Valls rightly pointed out: when violence is committed by states, our assessment tends to 
be quite permissive; giving states a great benefit of the 
doubt about the propriety of their violent acts... However, 
when the violence is committed by non state actors, we 
often react with horror and the condemnation cannot come 
fast enough... Hence, terrorism is almost universally 
condemned, violence by states, even when war has not 
been declared, is seen as legitimate, if not always fully 
justified2. 
It is important to recall that any genuine philosophy does not and will not entertain double standard. 
Political violence and terrorism cannot be an exception. According to C.A.J. Coady “consistency requires that 
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we apply the same standards to both kinds of political violence, state and non state3”. Even though for St 
Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas, there are morally relevant features of states that make the use of violence 
legitimate and its use by others illegitimate, it is inimitable that it cannot be the only explanation. In the words of 
Valls :on the most plausible account of just war theory, taking into account the ultimate moral basis of its criteria, 
violence undertaken by non state actors can, in principle, satisfy the requirements of just war as well4. 
Scholars along with their schools of thought have defined terrorism according to what they have in 
mind or want to prove. This makes the definition of terrorism more problematic. In contemporary politics for 
instance the term terrorism is mostly used by political actors to paint their opponents as devils or monsters. In 
academic circle, the understanding of terrorism becomes more complex at least on two counts: (a) 
moral/definitional and (b)use of stipulative /ordinary language. 
(a) Some scholars consider terrorism as already wrong and unjustifiable before they even define it. This makes 
the definition biased because it prejudges the substantive moral issue by a definitional consideration. As J. 
Teichman remarked, we ought not to begin by defining terrorism as a bad thing5; in reality, moral conclusions 
should follow from moral reasoning. So to decide a normative issue by definitional considerations, then, ends the 
discussion before it begins6 
(b)  Even though according to Teichman, any definition will necessarily be stipulative to some extent, but 
ordinary language does impose some constraints on the said stipulative definition that is acceptable. This is the 
case of Carl Wellman who defines terrorism as “the use or attempted use of terror as a means of coercion7. In 
Wellman’s understanding, when he instils terror in his students with threats of grade penalties on late papers, he 
commits terrorism.8 So for some scholars, the major aim of terrorism is to terrorize that is, a terrorist targets 
some to threaten many more. In this situation, the terrorist will be ill named because what he sometimes wants is 
not to terrorize but “the shocked attention of his audience population9. 
But not every violent act is terrorism. According to Virginia Held for instance, “we should probably not 
construe either the intention to spread fear or the intention to kill non-combatants as necessary for an act of 
political violence to be act of terrorism”10.It thus appears that terrorism could be perpetrated by both state and 
non state actors. Basically, any form of violence to achieve political goals is terrorism, or as Held put it: “I (see) 
terrorism as a form of violence to achieve political goals, where creating fear is usually high among the intended 
effects”11. However, for the purpose of this section, we simply define terrorism as violence committed by non 
state actors against persons or property for political purposes. 
In international ethics, just war theory is never considered a single theory; instead, it is a tradition 
within which there is a range of interpretation. Just war theory has the merit of “providing a framework for 
discussion about whether a war is just, rather than providing a set of unambiguous criteria that are easily 
applied12. So, just war theory becomes complex in international ethics especially when it comes to the 
interpretation of war as we shall see in this paper. 
 
Just War Theory and Just Cause 
Under just war theory, just cause simply means that a state has the right to defend itself against the aggression of 
other states. The implication here is that a just cause for a war is most of the times a defensive one. When for 
instance, a state feels that its territorial integrity or political independence is being threatened, it has a just cause 
to defend itself. The state being in charge of the protection of its citizens as well as other goods they hold dear, 
has the right of self determination. This is so because any right that a state enjoys is ultimately based on the 
rights of its citizens and therefore, it is important to note that the moral status of any state should be derivative 
and not foundational; derivative, because it is based on the rights of individuals within it. 
However, for the purpose of this paper, a major issue to be considered is: whether states only as 
organized political entities have the right to self-determination? Walzer’s analysis of John Stuart Mill is very 
educative. While discussing the concepts of intervention and non-intervention, Walzer argues that’ states 
generally ought not to intervene in the affairs of other states because to do so would be to violate the right of 
self-determination of the community within the state13. Walzer agrees with Mill that once the right of self-
determination is recognized, its implications go beyond a right against intervention or a right of defence.  As for 
the discussion on the concept of non-intervention, Walzer brings in the notion of secession which is very 
important to our arguments in this paper. According to Walzer, when a secessionist movement has demonstrated 
that it represents the will of its people, other states may intervene to aid the secession because, in this case, 
secession reflects the self-determination of that people. The implication of Walzer argument appears to be that 
under certain circumstances, certain kinds of groups enjoy a right of self-determination that entitles them to their 
own state or at least to some autonomy in a federal arrangement within an existing state. 
Although those circumstances vary14 the fact remains that groups other than those constituted by the 
state in which they live can have a just cause to defend their right of selft-determination15. For example, when 
the communal life of a nation is seriously threatened by a state, that nation has a just cause to defend itself.  In 
the situation where the whole nation is within a single state, secession is a justified option. This is also 
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recognized and endorsed by the United Nations (UN). According to Khatchadourian: “the UN definition of just 
cause recognizes the rights of peoples as well as states” and in article 7 of the definition of aggression, the UN 
refers to “the right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the Charter, of peoples 
forcibly deprived of that right”16  
From the above, it could be said that both morally and legally ‘peoples” or ‘nations’ enjoy a right to 
self-determination. So, while just war theory relies on the rights of the citizens to ground the right of a state to 
defend itself, other communities within a state may have that same right as well.  In other words, when the right 
to self-determination of some communities or peoples is frustrated, such peoples have the same just cause that 
states have when the self-determination of their citizens is threatened17. 
 
Just War Theory and Legitimate Authority 
As mentioned earlier, St Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas believed that only states can go to war justly. They 
ruled out private groups or non state actors waging private wars and claiming them to be just.  In other words, 
only the state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, so it is a necessary condition for a just war that it be 
undertaken by the entity that is uniquely authorized to wield the sword. To allow other entities, groups, or 
agencies to undertake violence would be to invite chaos18.  
Also, as stated earlier, the rising speed, the audience population and the popular support given to 
violence perpetrated by private or non state actors in modern Africa is a clear indication that the contemporary 
analysis of the question of just war theory must go beyond St Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas understanding. 
In line with the above, the equation of legitimate authority with states in the twenty-first century has been 
criticized by many Philosophers, myself included. Ordinarily, just war theory ought to be an assessment of the 
morality of war be it from state or non state actors. 
Gilbert for instance, has argued that “the equation of proper authority with a lawful claim to it should be 
resisted”19.  
As for Anthony Coates, to equate legitimate authority with state sovereignty is to rob the requirement of 
the moral force that it historically has had20. The result is that, Tony continues, the principle has become too 
permissive by assuming that any de facto state may wage war. According to him, this requirement then is too 
easily and quickly “checked off”:  If a war is waged by a state, this requirement is satisfied. Tony concludes that 
this interpretation has meant that the criterion of legitimate authority has become the most neglected of all the 
criteria that have been traditionally employed in the moral assessment of war”21  
More so, Tony Coates insists that it is not any given state that represents the interest and rights of its 
people. In other words, being a state is not sufficient for being a legitimate authority. And if this is true, it also 
follows that some private or non state actors can legitimately represent the rights and interests of the peoples. As 
a matter of fact, what matters most in just war theory, is the plausibility of the claim to represent the interests and 
rights of a people. 
In line with the above, Andrew Valls is of the opinion that some non state entities or organizations may 
represent a vey plausible case for being a people’s representative.  According to him, “if an organisation claims 
to act on behalf of a people and is widely seen by that people as legitimately doing so, then the rest of us should 
look on that organization as the legitimate authority of the people for the purposes of assessing its entitlement to 
engage in violence on their behalf22. Anthony Coates insists that the alternative view that only states may be 
legitimate authorities, “leads to political quietism (and is) conservative and uncritical23. Because once we 
acknowledge that state less peoples may have or have the right to self-determination, it would render that right 
otiose to deny that the right could be defended and vindicated by some nonstate entity. This is evidenced in the 
case of colonialism. People are prior to the state; or as Lugard rightly remarked “in the case of colonial 
domination, there is no victim state, thought there is a victim people”24 So, if as a people the colonized have a 
right to self-determination then, it follows that a non state organization or a would-be state can act as a legitimate 
authority and justly engage in violence on behalf of the people.  This is the case of the African National 
Congress (ANC) in South Africa, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, the 
M23 in Democratic Republic of Congo, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) ,Boko 
Haram both in Nigeria and the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL) to mention a few. 
 
Just War Theory and Discrimination 
As stated earlier, what St Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas had in mind was to study conditions under which it 
would be morally right and justified for a state to go to war or engage in violence. Thus the possible moral 
grounds for going to war (Jus and bellum) and the manner in which a just war must be carried out or fought (Jus 
in bello) were the two major concerns of the above mentioned scholars. 
It is on record that most of the times; terrorist acts are condemned, not so much for who carries them 
out and why but for how they are carried out. It is said that terrorism does not discriminate. The argument of this 
section is as follows: if we critically look at the basic tenets of just war theory, it is obvious that terrorism and 
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war are not so morally different from each other. Since the main purpose of just war theory is to place limits to 
violence and make peace, so if war can be justified, then terrorism can be as well. Andrew Valls summarizes it 
as follows:”I have argued that terrorism, understood as political violence committed by non state actors, can be 
accessed from the point of view of just war theory and that terrorist acts can indeed satisfy the theory’s 
criteria.”25 
It is a fact that some groups commit violence in the hope of winning the support of those they claim to 
already represent. The way those acts are carried fail to be morally justified. However, according to Fullinwider, 
even as that “this failure is contingent, not necessary. We cannot define terrorism into a moral corner where we 
do not have to worry any more about justification”.26 It is on record that failure to satisfy the requirements of just 
war theory is not unique to acts of terrorism. The same could be said of war themselves. The American invasion 
of Iraq in 2003 is a typical modern example. The 2003 Iraq war was a clear indication of just war theory 
violation. For the purpose of this paper, Andrew Valls conclusion appears interesting and illuminating. 
According to him: “either both interstate war and terrorism can be justified or neither can be”27. It seems obvious 
that under the modern interpretation of just war theory, there is no room discriminating terrorist acts from 
interstate war. 
 
Which Way Forward For Africa? 
In section one, we have discussed the basic components of just war theory such as: just cause, legitimate 
authority and discrimination and saw how it (just war theory) can and should accommodate terrorism. We have 
also said that the rising speed, the audience population and popular support given to violence perpetrated by non 
state actors or terrorist groups in modern Africa is a clear indication that the modern interpretation of just war 
theory must go beyond St Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas understanding. I have argued that under the 
modern interpretation of just war theory, there is no room discriminating terrorist acts from interstate war. 
So we are now left with the analysis of some possible ways and lessons for Africa as far as the 
accommodation of terrorism is concerned. It is the opinion of this paper that forms of government and their 
application in post colonial Africa could be responsible for the double standard in assessing the just war theory. I 
submit that the modern interpretation of just war theory that is, the interpretation that accommodates non state 
actors or terrorist groups cannot be effective unless in a genuine democratic society. In other words, genuine 
democracy or democratization is what is required for just war theory to be effective in modern Africa. For as 
noted earlier, the main purpose of just war theory is to place limits to violence and make peace and not war for 
war sake. 
 
Monarchy, Democracy and Just War Theory in Modern Africa 
Monarchy and democracy appear to be the two major forms of government in post colonial Africa. Our main 
business in this section is to analyse and see to what extent they have contributed or can contribute to the 
understanding and application of just war theory as discussed above. In other words, this section is an 
opportunity for us to see whether monarchy and democracy as currently practiced in Africa, can actually fit into 
the modern interpretation of just war theory as defended above. That is, the interpretation  according which 
violence committed by both  state and terrorist groups are morally and legally justified, where there is no room 
discriminating terrorist acts from interstate war. 
 
Monarchy and Just War Theory 
Etymologically, monarchy is derived from two Greek words monos which stands for alone and arkhein which 
stands for rule. So, monarchy means to “rule alone”. It is a government by one individual not subject to any legal 
limitations or to paraphrase Aristotle, monarchy is a government by one individual who does everything 
according to his own will.  There are hereditary and elective as well as absolute and limited or constitutional 
forms of monarchy. But according to Bluntschli, the essence of any form of monarchy is “the personification of 
the majesty and sovereignty of the state in an individual. This means two things:  
(i) the personal elevation of the head of the state, as the individual representative and organ of the 
supreme power, and  
(ii) the substantial concentration in the monarch of the highest dignity and power of the state.”28   
From the above definition, it is obvious that there is not and there will never be a meeting point between 
monarchy and the modern interpretation and understanding of just war theory. In monarchy there is no room for 
discussion, alternative views and tolerance. Friends of monarchy claim that it provides the most satisfactory 
government for those who cannot govern themselves, who “have not yet developed a high political 
consciousness and who therefore lack the capacity themselves for participating actively in the management of 
public affairs. Perhaps no better form could be devised for disciplining uncivilized peoples, leading them out of 
barbarism and inculcating in them habits of obedience”29. More so, the greater the unity within the government 
itself, the greater the likelihood of achieving unity among the people30. And finally, the unity and orderliness 
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necessary to every stable political society can best be secured only where supreme authority is vested in a single 
ruler31. From the above arguments, it is obvious that no monarchy regime will ever accommodate violence 
committed by non state actors or terrorist groups. 
 
Democracy and Just War Theory 
Apart from monarchy, democracy is another major form of government in post colonial Africa. Even though 
according to K. A. Busia: “the colonial powers left a legacy of ideas and techniques which could help any 
country whose leaders wished to establish democratic forms of government”.32 It is not until the year 1990 that 
the so called democratic governments started coming up in Africa. I argue that even if a citizen is obviously freer 
under a democracy than under a monarchy or dictatorship, the type of democracy currently being practiced in 
Africa is yet to meet the international/universal standard thereby making it very difficult to accommodate the 
modern interpretation and understanding of just war theory. 
Basically, “democracy may be described as a system of government under which the people exercise 
the governing power either directly or through representatives periodically elected by themselves33. The fact still 
remains that the institutions of democracy are not the same everywhere, and Africa is not an exception. For the 
purpose of this paper, I argue that democracy is made up of principles and ideal which are universal. Therefore, 
any country or continent that aspires to those principles and ideals can easily accommodate the modern 
interpretation of just war theory as understood and defended in this paper. 
First of all, one of the major difficulties about democracy is that countries with quite different political 
ideologies use the same word to describe their respective systems. This is also the case with Africa since the year 
1990. Most African countries are known to be practicing democracy. I argue that the level and type of 
democracy being practiced by African countries are not ripe enough to accommodate the modern interpretation 
and understanding of just war theory. For instance, though democratic, African countries are yet to truly 
acknowledge the existence of opposition as a positive contribution to the success of democracy. Instead, in 
modern Africa, opposition is still considered as a source of social instability or disunity. Meanwhile, as K. A. 
Busia rightly pointed out: “the existence of political parties as an instrument of political rivalry not only allows 
for the expression of dissent but also offers the people a choice of alternatives. Furthermore he continues, the 
opposition helps to make all citizens, including those who disagree with the party in power, a part of the 
democratic system. The party system and the opposition are a part of the machinery of government”.34 
I agree with friends of African democracy that the historical and social conditions of Africa are 
different from those of Europe, and the political institutions which African countries will find most suitable to 
express democratic values may well be different. Therefore, Africans cannot be expected to adopt the same 
institutions as those of Westminster.  However, what I query is the ability of African countries to fully and 
genuinely embark on the universal principles and ideals of democracy which are freedom, equality tolerance, 
alternative and compromise, to mention a few. There is no doubt that Africans have the right to evolve 
institutions which fit them best in their own historical and social context but the fact still remains that others also 
have a right to expect the values of democracy to which the institutions give expression to be genuinely and 
universally recognizable. African countries cannot legitimately claim to have their own particular brands of 
democracy with values so different from those of other nations that there are no meeting points. Democracy has 
a moral language which peoples of different cultures and races can understand. What matters most is the genuine 
application of the universal principles and ideals of democracy which are still lacking in present day Africa. And, 
as long as this lack of genuine democracy persists, African policy makers or political leaders will never 
accommodate non state actors or terrorist groups. As I have argued, under the modern interpretation of just war 
theory, the only way forward is for African leaders to embark on a genuine democracy and have a rethink of 
terrorism. 
 The “ingredients” of genuine democracy according to K. A. Busia34, can be summarized as follows: 
Almost every African state admits that democracy is founded on respect for the human being. This 
implies that every man should have a say in how he is governed and by who he is governed. Every citizen should 
be free to criticise his government and be protected.  In any genuine democratic society, freedom of speech, 
publication and association are always guaranteed. Practitioners of genuine democracy must recognize the right 
of others to think differently and to choose differently. The spirit of tolerance is also one of the very important 
requirements for success of democracy. Democracy is government by consent. Any genuine democratic society 
provides methods and institutions for the preservation of liberty. For instance, the institutions of different 
political parties, the recognition of an opposition and the rule of law are essentials for democracy. 
As for A. Appadorai35, democracy gives opportunity for political participation, political equality and the 
possibility of alternative government. Democracy requires proper organization and leadership. It postulates a 
measure of personal freedom and equal consideration for all classes. Democracy does not believe in suppression 
of thought.  Helvetius once said: “I detest your opinions, but I will content to the death for your right to utter 
them”. 
Research on Humanities and Social Sciences                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN (Paper)2224-5766 ISSN (Online)2225-0484 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.1, 2016 
 
50 
As already mentioned, democracy is made up of principles and ideals. And, the history of democracies 
all over the world has shown that these conditions are rarely fulfilled.  To paraphrase A. Appadorai, in practice, 
democracy is the rule of ignorance. However, for the purpose of this paper, I argue that, no matter how defective 
as a form of government democracy may be, a genuine one remains the only way forward for present day Africa. 
As I have already argued, it is only in a genuine democratic society that African leaders or policy makers can 
accommodate the modern interpretation of the just war theory thereby have a rethink about violence perpetrated 
by non state actors or terrorist groups. 
I choose democracy because despite its defects, it still implies recognition of the duties of government 
and the rights of the people. To paraphrase John Stuart Mill, democracy is superior to other forms of government 
because the rights and interests of every person are secured from being disregarded. The democratic method is to 
reach decision by discussion, argument and persuasion. As for A. Appadorai: “no realistic thinker regards 
democracy as the ideal form of government, it is at best the least objectionable form of government that is 
practicable...  Things may be bad today, but they were worse yesterday”36. Finally, Cavour’s remark is very 
interesting and illuminating.  According to him, “however faulty a legislative chamber may be, an ante-chamber 
is worse. However grave the indictment that may be brought against democracy.  Its friends can answer, what 
better alternative do you offer?” 
 
Concluding Remarks 
This work has attempted to address two fundamental issues in moral and political Philosophy. The first is the 
critic of the double standard used under just war theory when it comes to the right to violence by state and non 
state or terrorist groups. The second issue is about the discussion on a genuine way forward for Africa due to the 
rising speed and popular support currently given to terrorism all over the continent. 
As for the first issue, I have argued that under an objective analysis of just war theory, violence 
perpetrated by both state and non state or terrorist groups should be morally and legally justified without any 
form of discrimination whatsoever. State violence is not and should not be the only legitimate violence. As for 
the second issue, I have argued that the rising speed and the popular support given to violence perpetrated by non 
state actors or terrorist groups in present day Africa is a clear indication that the analysis of the question of just 
war theory must go beyond St Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas understanding.  Because ordinarily, just war 
theory ought to be an assessment of the morality of war be it from state or non state actors. Consequently, 
African countries must embark on a genuine democratization process which appears to be the only way forward 
for now. Why democracy? Because it is superior to other forms of government, it is at best the least 
objectionable form of government that is practicable. Democracy is the only form of government with universal 
principles and ideals which are freedom, equality, rule of law, tolerance, alternative and compromise to mention 
just a few.  I therefore submit that it is only in a genuine democratic society and under the modern interpretation 
of just war theory that violence perpetrated by non -state actors or terrorist groups can be morally and legally 
justified and accommodated. African policy-makers or political leaders should always have in mind that the 
main purpose of just war theory is to place limits to violence and make peace and not war for war sake. For now, 
that cannot happen, unless in a genuine democratic society which African nations are hopefully still searching 
for. 
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